tions adopted by federal circuit courts, 15 including those in which they are geographically situated, 16 which lack direct appellate review authority over them. 17 As a consequence, on all issues other than the comparatively narrow range of questions expressly addressed by the Supreme Court, 18 state and lower federal courts are free to disagree, creating conditions ripe for the constitutional conflict feared by the Framers.
This Article provides the first in-depth examination of state-federal concurrent constitutional authority and does so by focusing on a context in which its consequences are most problematic: within individual states. While a handful of articles over the years have examined state court power vis-à-vis federal constitutional questions more generally, 19 no systematic effort has been undertaken to examine intrastate, state-federal conflict on federal con-15 See State v. Coleman, 214 A.2d 393, 403 (N.J. 1965 ) ("In passing on federal constitutional questions, the state courts and the lower federal courts have the same responsibility and occupy the same position; there is parallelism but not paramountcy for both sets of courts are governed by the same reviewing authority of the Supreme Court.").
16 See, e.g., Owsley v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 804, 805 (4th Cir. 1965 ) ("Though state courts may for policy reasons follow the decisions of the Court of Appeals whose circuit includes their state they are not obliged to do so." (citation omitted)); State v. McDowell, 310 S.E.2d 301, 310 (N.C. 1984 ) (noting that it "accord [s] . . . decisions of lower federal courts such persuasiveness as these decisions might reasonably command").
17 See United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072 , 1076 (7th Cir. 1970 ) (noting that "because lower federal courts exercise no appellate jurisdiction over state tribunals, decisions of lower federal courts are not conclusive on state courts").
18 See Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 160 (1825) (" [T] he construction given by this Court to the constitution and laws of the United States is received by all as the true construction . . . ."). Yet even on matters that the Court has addressed uncertainty can remain, given the commonly indeterminate nature of precedent. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1994) ("Deciding what a precedent means will frequently depend on the particular normative values and assumptions each judge brings to the interpretive enterprise."). At the same time, from the perspective of lower courts, the Court's decisions often can leave open as many questions as they resolve. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76 (2006) (acknowledging that lower court conflicts " [r] eflect[ ] [a] lack of guidance from this Court"); Adam Liptak, Justices Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2010 , at A1. Not to be overlooked as well is the modern Court's penchant for plurality opinions, which can make it difficult to discern operable rules. See generally Justin Marceau, Plurality Decisions: Upward-Flowing Precedent and Acoustic Separation, 45 CONN. L. REV. 933, 936 (2013) .
19 Of these, Professor Paul Bator's brief article written over three decades ago is the most significant. See Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981) . Even when examined, however, state court power to differ on federal constitutional questions has been misunderstood. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State Courts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1, 73-74 (2007) ("Today, a single body of federal constitutional law, generated by the United States Supreme Court through [its] power to review all state court decisions on federal constitutional issues, means that citizens do not live with different federal constitutional rights depending on the decisions of their state courts."). stitutional questions. 20 This Article redresses this deficit, using as its doctrinal locus federal constitutional criminal procedure, with its unique impact on government power and individual liberty and privacy.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I begins by providing an overview of the growing power of state courts to interpret and apply federal constitutional provisions, and then considers the important benefits of state court involvement. State court decisions, much like state legislative enactments extolled by Justice Brandeis, 21 provide a basis for real-world experiments to gauge the effects of doctrine, cabined (unlike the decisions of federal circuits) to individual states. The decisions themselves, moreover, originate in a context that is in many ways distinct from that of federal courts. State courts process a massively greater number of criminal cases, affording them corresponding greater experience with criminal procedure matters; they also function in a decidedly different institutional environment, including having to stand for election. Over the years this latter distinction has fueled the expectation that state courts will reflexively endorse pro-government positions on civil liberty questions, 22 an expectation belied by the results of a survey reported on here of state court decisions coming before the Roberts Court.
Part II examines how state courts go about operationalizing their federal constitutional interpretive power alongside the federal circuits. Despite some lingering scholarly doubt on the question, 23 and resistance from the Ninth Circuit in particular, 24 today the vast majority of state courts address 20 The work that has been done has failed to focus on constitutional conflict and gives short shrift to its many important practical and theoretical ramifications. REV. 943 (1948) [hereinafter Authority in State Courts] . 21 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (extolling value of social and economic legislative "experiments" undertaken "without risk to the rest of the country").
22 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 802 (1965) ; Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 REV. , 1116 REV. nn.45-46 (1977 .
23 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 45 n.25 (6th ed. 2002) (noting the "interesting question of the weight state courts should give to decisions of lower federal courts when the state court is applying federal law"); Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 31 (2006) ("[T] he question of whether state courts are bound by lower federal courts on the federal law's content remains open."); Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601 , 1663 -64 (2002 ("The hubris of state courts that refuse to follow the definitive interpretations of federal law made by the federal courts with jurisdiction over the state's territory is remarkable . . . .").
24 See Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 769 (9th Cir. 2009 ) ("It is the federal courts that are the final arbiters of federal constitutional rights, not the state courts."); Bennett v. federal constitutional questions free of any felt need to defer to federal circuits, including their own. 25 The power-sharing arrangement gives rise to doctrinal conflicts on multiple important constitutional criminal procedure questions. For instance, the California Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit disagree on whether the "community caretaking" doctrine can justify the warrantless entry of a home by police, 26 as do the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit. 27 State and federal circuits differ on any number of other search and seizure questions, including whether police can perform a protective "frisk" for weapons in the absence of reasonable suspicion that the individual targeted is engaged in criminal wrongdoing. 28 Similar conflicts exist in the Fifth and Sixth Amendment contexts with respect to confessions. 29 The conflicts create an array of significant difficulties. Perhaps most notably, basic rule of law expectations are undercut when national constitutional law is permitted to depend on the uniform worn by law enforcement agents or the court in which a criminal case is filed. While state constitutional norms can and do vary, here the divergent doctrinal positions emanate from the same legal source, the U.S. Constitution, which controls regardless of the government actor or court 30 and which citizens accept as the national Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2003 ) ("[S]tate courts will not be the final arbiters of important issues under the federal constitution . . . ." (quoting Minnesota v. Nat'l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940))). Notably, the circuit has persisted in its position despite a prior chastening by the Supreme Court. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 58 n.11 (1997) (terming the Ninth Circuit's suggestion of state court subservience "remarkable").
25 See, e.g., Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088 , 1098 (noting that "the views of the federal courts of appeals do not bind the California Supreme Court when it decides a federal constitutional question"); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J. , concurring) ("The Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law, but neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that a state court's interpretation of federal law give way to a (lower) federal court's interpretation.").
26 Compare United States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1993 ) (disallowing warrantless entry of home based on the community caretaking rationale), with People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 938 (Cal. 1999 ) (allowing warrantless entry), cert. denied, 528 U. S. 1187 (2000) .
27 Compare United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204, 208-09 (7th Cir. 1982 ) (disallowing warrantless entry), with State v. Pinkard, 785 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Wis. 2010 ) (allowing warrantless entry), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 Ct. (2011 .
28 Compare United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170 , 1173 (9th Cir. 2007 ) (allowing frisk in the absence of lawful seizure), with State v. Serna, 431 P.3d 406, 410 (Ariz. 2014) (expressly rejecting the Ninth Circuit position); compare United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d 524, 528 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that in a consensual encounter "an officer may not conduct [a] protective search for purposes of safety until he has a reasonable suspicion [of criminal activity]"), with Bailey v. State, 987 A.2d 72, 83 (Md. 2010 ) (explaining that an "articulable suspicion to believe that criminal activity [is] afoot" is not necessary in order to conduct a protective pat-down search during a consensual encounter).
29 See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text. 30 See O'Connor, supra note 12, at 4 (positing that "a single sovereign's laws should be applied equally to all"). civic norm. 31 When this occurs, individual rights and the scope of government power are left to happenstance, calling into question basic expectations of governmental consistency and even-handedness. The variable rights regime, in turn, creates the risk of forum shopping as prosecutors strategically gravitate toward more prosecution-friendly doctrines.
Conflicts also affect civil rights litigation. For instance, when a state court and its coordinate federal circuit court disagree on whether a particular law enforcement actor (e.g., a county sheriff) qualifies as a state agent, triggering Eleventh Amendment immunity, the forum-filing decisions of plaintiffs (not prosecutors) are affected. By the same token, when a court adopts a more rights-restrictive position, law enforcement will enjoy qualified immunity, resulting in a right recognized by the other court going unenforced.
Ultimately, the conflicts themselves, in the wake of very significant limits placed on the scope of federal habeas corpus review, 32 can only be mediated by the nation's "one supreme Court." 33 as a "compelling reason[ ]" to grant certiorari. 38 Meanwhile, in the handful of cases that it agrees to hear, the Court blithely elides the reality of intrastate conflicts, electing instead to note only the existence of federal circuit splits or discord on a question more generally. 39 Part III canvasses the reform proposals advanced to date designed to mediate state-federal constitutional conflict. Finding each wanting, Part IV offers an alternative, one hiding in plain view: amendment of the federal certification provision. 40 Although federal courts have enjoyed authority since 1802 to certify disputed questions to the Supreme Court for resolution, Congress has never extended such authority to state courts. Expanding certification to include state and federal courts alike would have several important benefits. In addition to ensuring the speedy resolution of intrastate constitutional conflicts, and curing the serious problems that they create, the expansion will elevate state courts to their rightful place in federal constitutional discourse. It will also help pave the way for a more engaged relationship between state and lower federal courts and the Supreme Court charged with overseeing their work and ensuring federal constitutional consistency.
I. STATE COURT AUTHORITY AND ITS BENEFITS

A. Historical Evolution
State courts have long played a role in federal constitutional litigation. Their authority to decide federal constitutional questions, however, arises chiefly on an inferential basis: Article III speaks only of "one supreme Court," and fails to require creation of lower federal courts, 41 leaving state courts by default as decisionmakers. 42 Lower federal courts, created by Congress 38 See SUP. CT. R. 10(a)-(c). 39 See, e.g., Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 , 1131 & n.4 (2014 (noting only that the California court agreed with a "majority of the federal circuits" while ignoring that the court's position conflicted with the position adopted by the Ninth Circuit); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (citing a "chorus . . . includ[ing] courts, scholars, and Members of this Court" calling for its prior decision in New York v. Belton to be revisited, yet ignoring that the Arizona Supreme Court's decision limiting Belton created a conflict with the Ninth Circuit); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 108 (2006) (referring only to a "split of authority" on whether police can enter a home when a physically present co-occupant objects, failing to note the conflict in question between the Georgia Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit).
40 See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2012). 41 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (vesting judicial power in "one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish").
42 See 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 TO , at 211 (1971 (noting that lower federal courts were not needed because state courts were regarded as "adequate"); see also Matthew I. Hall, Asymmetrical Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1257 REV. , 1263 REV. (2011 ; James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 216-17 (2007). shortly after the nation's founding, 43 did not come to enjoy general federal question jurisdiction until 1875. 44 Even though the Judiciary Act of 1789 signaled a degree of mistrust of state courts, 45 (2008) ("In the general constitutional order of the early republic, the lower federal courts played but a peripheral role in an era dominated by the ascendancy of the common law and state judiciaries.").
45 The Act empowered the Supreme Court to review by writ of error any decision in which a state court denied a federal right, title, or interest, which as Professor James Pfander has noted "doubtless reflected some distrust of the state courts." Pfander, supra note 42, at 232. Based on authority granted in Article III, section 2, the Act similarly granted the federal judiciary diversity jurisdiction in civil cases, affording federal courts power to adjudicate claims brought by citizens of different states or non-U.S. citizens. See Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 509 (1928) .
46 Alexander Hamilton, for instance, expressed concern that state courts would fail to consider national interests because of "local views and prejudices" and "look with peculiar deference towards that authority to which they owe their official existence." THE FEDERAL-IST NO. 22, at 113 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). As Brian Fitzpatrick has noted, however, Hamilton was also prone to lavishing state courts with praise for their independence and competence. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation and the History of State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 VA. L. REV. 839, 874-75 (2012) . Likewise, Judge Friendly's survey of Framing-era state cases suggests that diversity jurisdiction was motivated not so much by fear of state judicial prejudice but rather worry over state legislatures. Friendly, supra note 45, at 495-97; see also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 346 (1816) 54 In addition, due to the slow emergence of habeas corpus authority, state courts operated free of lower federal court oversight. The latter did not come to have habeas review authority over state criminal cases until after the Civil War, and then only with respect to the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 55 Not until 1953 were lower federal courts empowered to review the validity of state court convictions implicating federal constitutional claims. 56 Over time, state courts have come to play an ever-greater role in federal constitutional litigation. 57 Starting in the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court, through gradual application of the incorporation doc- As discussed next, moreover, state court participation in the evolution of federal constitutional criminal procedure doctrine has a variety of important functional benefits.
B. The Functional Benefits of State Court Power
Experimentation
Invoking Justice Brandeis's ideal, 63 it has long been asserted that the independent decisionmaking authority of the nation's regionally arrayed twelve federal circuit courts afford experimentalist benefit. 64 65 But see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 170 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) ("I have never believed that under the guise of federalism the States should be able to experiment with the protections afforded our citizens through the Bill of Rights."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (extolling the value of "experiments" undertaken "without risk to the rest of the country").
70 In addition, under such circumstances it is conceivable that a Tieboutian sorting benefit can accrue, as state residents can "vote with their feet" in pursuit of preferable positions adopted elsewhere. See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 2. State "Voice" A second major benefit concerns the unique perspective state courts bring to the job of federal constitutional interpretation and application. State courts not only have been engaged in constitutional interpretation for a far longer time than lower federal courts, 71 they also process an exponentially higher volume of criminal cases than federal courts, 72 affording them corresponding greater experience in the resolution of constitutional criminal procedure questions. 73 State courts, moreover, operate within an institutional context that very often differs from their federal judicial counterparts. 74 The difference is such that, to the extent that judicial decisionmaking is animated by what political scientists refer to as "team theory," 75 state courts operate from the perspective of a distinctly different team. 76 Finally, unlike life-tenured federal judges, state judges most often stand for election, 77 providing what Professor David Pozen has called a "systematic and pervasive mechanism for popular constitutionalism." 78 "The brute fact of having to face the voters," as Professors Bruhl and Leib recently noted, "gives elected judges a strong motivation to understand how the public will receive their rulings." 79 Many state judges, moreover, have themselves previously served as elected officials, which supplies a degree of "political savvy and comprehension." 80 The political responsiveness of state courts has of course long dominated discourse concerning their institutional competence to decide federal constitutional questions. Alexander Hamilton expressed the fear that state courts would be less likely to give full scope to federal rights that are unpopular locally, 81 a view echoed many decades later in Professor Neuborne's classic article The Myth of Parity. 82 Such political pressures would logically have quite significant impact in the criminal procedure realm given the common unpopularity of extending rights to criminal defendants. 83 Adopting a right-restrictive position might also be seen as the "safest" position in the face of jurisprudential uncertainty, 84 and adopting a right-restrictive position at variance with the federal state supreme court justices are subject to election of some kind in at least thirty-nine states).
78 Cases, 1973 -1995 , 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839 , 1855 (noting that despite the common belief that federal judges are more likely to overturn capital cases than elected state judges, the latter accounted for 90% of cases overturned during study period, prompting the study's authors to conclude that "state judges are the first and most important line of defense against erroneous death sentences").
88 The survey consisted of cases collectively drawn from the SCOTUS Blog and the BNA Reporter.
89 The survey examined cases coming to the Court by direct appeal from a state court, § 1983, and state post-conviction. It omitted federal habeas cases because the standard of federal review is so undemanding. See infra text accompanying notes 242-45; see also Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 778 n.3 (2010) 95 See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 , 1980 96 See, e.g., Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 , 1056 (reversing, by a 9-0 vote, the Florida Supreme Court, which "flouted" established law on probable cause analysis). For a pre-Roberts Court example, see Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001) . In Sullivan, which concerned application of Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) , holding that an officer's pretextual subjective motivation for making a stop is irrelevant so long as the facts objectively support a lawful basis, the Arkansas Supreme Court asserted that "there is nothing that prevents this court from interpreting the U.S. Constitution more broadly than the United States Supreme Court, which has the effect of providing more rights." Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 771 (quoting State v. Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d 551, 552 (Ark. 2000) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam opinion, stating that the Arkansas Supreme Court's position was "flatly contrary to [the] Court's controlling precedent." Id. And, in a fit of seeming passive aggressiveness, it offered that the state court's belief that it could "provide greater protection than this Court's own federal constitutional precedents provide . . . surely must be an inadvertent error." Id. at 772 (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 & n.4 (1975) 102 And, in Florida v. Jardines, the Court backed the Florida Supreme Court's position that police use of a drug-detection dog to sniff the exterior of a home constituted a search, triggering Fourth Amendment protection 103 -a position rejected by the vast majority of state and almost all federal circuit courts. 104 In short, far from constituting "needless conflict between state and federal courts," 105 the varied doctrinal positions adopted by state and lower federal courts serve as essential grist in the ongoing exposition of the nation's Constitution. 106 Moreover, affording states in particular-sovereigns whose "dignity" is thought worthy of respect 107 -a chance to be involved in the making of national constitutional law has a federalism-enforcing benefit. It allows buy-in, affording an avenue for what Professor Paul Bator termed "membership" in the nation's "cooperative moral and legal community." 108 ter is far more prone to reverse than affirm. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 271 (5th ed. 2012) Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) ; see also Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 280 (2008) ("States are independent sovereigns with plenary authority . . . ."). 108 Bator, supra note 19, at 635; see also Authority in State Courts, supra note 20, at 948 (explaining that state court "freedom to make their own decisions will eliminate any latent sentiment in the state courts that national law is in some way foreign to them").
II. PRAXIS AND PROBLEMS
The story of state court empowerment just recounted, however, yields only a partial picture of the true significance of state court authority. This added significance comes into focus when one takes account of a key structural fact, noted at the outset: the authority of state courts to reject the constitutional positions of federal circuit courts, including those of the circuit in which they are located. 109 This Part surveys how state courts go about exercising their constitutional autonomy and then discusses the practical problems that arise when state courts and their coordinate federal circuits disagree.
A. State Approaches
While in the past state courts often felt obliged to defer to the federal constitutional decisions of federal circuits, 110 today at least forty-six states and the District of Columbia regard such decisions as non-binding and worthy of at most persuasive precedential weight. 111 Typically, the courts assert their position in blanket, unequivocal terms. 112 Strouth v. State, 999 S.W.2d 759, 765 n.9 (Tenn. 1999 ) (explaining that a state court is "not bound by decisions of the federal district and circuit courts"); State v. Mechtel, 499 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Wis. 1993 ) ("It is clear . . . that determinations on federal questions by either the federal circuit courts of appeal or the federal district courts are not binding upon state courts."). 113 State v. Robinson, 82 P.3d 27, 30 (Mont. 2003) . 114 See State v. Smith, 881 A.2d 160, 181 n.15 (Conn. 2005 ) (deeming Second Circuit "particularly persuasive"); Holloway v. United States, 951 A.2d 59, 63 (D.C. 2008 ) (deeming the D.C. Circuit "highly persuasive" (citation omitted)); State v. Gardner, 509 A.2d little more than lip service 115 or flatly reject that circuit dominion is relevant. 116 The growth in state court autonomy signals an important shift in the nation's judiciary, one underscored by the work of social scientists examining state-federal court relations. Professor Laurence Benner and his colleagues, for instance, in reviewing state court cases decided from 1915 to 1936 regarding whether to adopt the federal exclusionary rule (mandated by Weeks v. United States), 117 discovered a distinct circuit-centrism. 118 They found that decisions adopting the exclusionary rule by other state courts located in the same federal circuit were key, having more influence than courts in a neighboring state or states situated in the same West reporter or census region. 119 Building on prior research detecting a similar influence, 120 the authors attributed the outcome to the enhanced communication within and influence of federal circuits. 121 The findings reported here suggest operation of a far less pronounced federal circuit court impact.
At least as interesting is the contrast the findings have with the way state courts handle interpretation of their own state constitutions. Although enjoying the undisputed right to interpret their constitutions as they see fit, state courts very often interpret their constitutions in a manner that is in "lockstep" with the Supreme Court. 122 The asymmetry allows for some curi- 1160 , 1163 (Me. 1986 ) (deferring to the First Circuit "so far as reasonably possible"); Phillips v. Williams, 608 P.2d 1131, 1135 (Okla. 1989) (finding the Tenth Circuit "highly persuasive"). 115 The Ohio Supreme Court, for instance, affords Sixth Circuit caselaw only "some persuasive weight." State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 862 (Ohio 2001 225, 249-51 (2007) . And even when professing to undertake independent constitutional interpretation, state courts very often really do so in name only, engaging in what one commentator has termed "counterfeit" analysis. Francis Barry McCarthy, ous outcomes. In California, for example, state courts defer to federal wisdom (from the U.S. Supreme Court) on how to interpret their state constitution, 123 yet disregard lower federal court wisdom when it comes to interpreting the U.S. Constitution. 124 Although Supreme Court decisions obviously bear greater precedential weight than those of lower federal courts, the ready resistance of California courts to their lower federal counterparts on federal constitutional questions is nonetheless noteworthy. 125 Whether it to some degree perhaps reflects a tit-for-tat institutional response based on rejection of one another's decisions more generally, 126 or offense taken at the common federal disregard of state constitutional doctrine (from the Supreme Court on down), 127 is a provocative question to ponder.
Finally, it should not go unmentioned that state court autonomy is selective; it does not extend to all federal legal questions. Although states typically ignore lower federal court wisdom on federal constitutional questions, they often defer to federal courts on the interpretation of federal statutes. Illinois, for instance, gives "considerable weight" to and finds "highly persuasive" federal court interpretations of federal statutes, but goes its own way on constitutional questions. 128 Deference is needed "in the interest of preserving unity" because "uniformity of decision is an important consideration when state courts interpret federal statutes." 129 134 limiting police authority to search a car's interior when an arrestee has been secured, extends to the non-auto context. 135 Conflicts also exist on whether police can:
• conduct a warrantless safety "sweep" of a home in situations other than when an in-home arrest occurs 136
Ct. App. 2014) (noting that although it was not bound by federal lower court decisions the federal interest in "harmony" and "uniformity" in maritime law dictates deference). 130 See Clermont, supra note 23, at 31 ("In both the Erie setting and the reverse-Erie setting, the court's job is to apply the other sovereign's law, not to create law for it."); Omar K. Madhany, Comment, Towards a Unified Theory of "Reverse-Erie," 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1261, 1299 (2014) (positing that federal courts are best situated to divine federal congressional intent). 131 Except of course when Congress explicitly seeks uniformity in the interpretation and application of its statutes. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985) • enter, without a search warrant, the common area of an apartment or other multi-dwelling unit to conduct an investigation 142 • conduct a pat-down search of all companions of arrestees (the "automatic companion" rule) 143 • search a non-occupant visitor's belongings pursuant to a search warrant for a home 144 • enter a suspect's home without probable cause to believe that the suspect is at home when executing an arrest warrant. 145 Fourth Amendment doctrine on the power of law enforcement to seize individuals is marked by similar conflicts, with differences existing on whether police can:
• stop an individual based on reasonable suspicion that they have committed a past misdemeanor (versus a past felony) 146 • enter a home without a warrant in "hot pursuit" to arrest a fleeing misdemeanant (as opposed to a felon) 147 • search or arrest a motorist after a canine alerts to the presence of drugs in his car, when the ensuing search yields no drugs 148 • conduct an auto checkpoint, resulting in discovery of criminal activity, without authorization by an elected official 149 • retain a motorist's license without qualifying as a seizure. 150 Intrastate disputes also exist on basic questions of Fourth Amendment standing to challenge conduct by law enforcement. 151 State and lower federal courts within the same federal circuit also differ on Fifth and Sixth Amendment questions. For example, with the Fifth Amendment, they disagree on the application of the "question first, the execution of a search warrant 155 qualifies as "custody" sufficient to trigger Miranda requirements. In the Sixth Amendment context, conflict exists on questions such as the factors used to determine when an individual becomes a "government agent" sufficient to trigger the Amendment's protections. 156 The conflicts noted above highlight the long-ignored but quite extensive empiric reality of state-federal constitutional disuniformity within individual states. They also, as discussed next, have a variety of important real-world consequences.
Rule of Law
Perhaps most significant, the conflicts undercut basic rule of law expectations. Allowing the content of national constitutional law to depend on the uniform worn by a particular government agent or whether a case is filed in state or federal court is at odds with the core expectation of horizontal consistency in the law's content and application. 157 As Professor Daniel Meador has observed:
One of the most basic features of law is that it embodies a set of rules and principles applicable to everyone in like manner throughout the jurisdiction it purports to govern. A judicial system that produces legal doctrine differing because of the happenstance of the place of litigation and of the particular judges sitting on the case is hostile to the reign of law. 158 Concern over rights inconsistency, it might be offered, is unwarranted given the constitutional variation that already exists as a result of state court power to interpret state constitutions more generously than the federal constitution. 159 Here, however, courts disagree over rights contained (or not) in the same constitution, one that controls in state and federal courts and regardless of whether the action of state or federal law enforcement agents is challenged. 160 Under such circumstances, as the Supreme Court has warned, individuals "cannot know the scope of [their] constitutional protection." 161 They lack advance knowledge of their liberty and privacy rights and the parameters of government power to investigate and intrude on their lives. 162 State-federal court conflicts, moreover, have an impact that is greater than the sum of their individual parts. They create what is effectively a constitutional prism in a state, 163 and perhaps even several states within a given circuit when state courts themselves differ with one another and their circuit, 164 magnifying in corresponding degree concern over governmental consistency and evenhandedness. 165 159 See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text. 160 See Head v. State, 322 S.E.2d 228, 231 (Ga. 1984) ("[W] e must acknowledge that while this court is not bound by the rulings of the federal court of appeals for our circuit, the citizens of this state, including prison officials, are most assuredly bound by the orders emanating from such rulings."). 161 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1981) ; see also State v. Kock, 725 P.2d 1285 , 1287 (Or. 1986 ) (averring that citizens "have their constitutional rights spelled out as clearly as possible"); cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (plurality opinion) ("Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."). 162 In the context of Miranda doctrine, as a dissenting member of the California Supreme Court said in relation to the majority's adoption of a less protective position than that adopted by the Ninth Circuit, the conflict both "invites forum shopping . . . and causes confusion for anyone arrested in California on a question that is always important: If I remain silent, can my silence be used against me or not?" People v. Tom, 331 P.3d 303, 324 (Cal. 2014 ) (Liu, J., dissenting). 163 It is worth noting that the current uncertainty would have been heightened had states such as California been segmented into two or more circuits, as once proposed to reduce especially heavy circuit caseloads. See generally Arthur D. Hellman, Legal Problems of Dividing a State Between Federal Judicial Circuits, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1188 (1974 . 164 For example, with respect to the criteria used to determine whether police justifiably entered a home without a search warrant based on concern that evidence might be destroyed, compare United States v. Mongold, 528 F. App'x 944, 949 (10th Cir. 2013) (specifying four factors to consider, including that a "serious crime" is involved), with People v. Wehmas, 246 P.3d 642, 649 (Colo. 2010) (en banc) (specifying four factors to consider but omitting mention of crime seriousness and adding, unlike the Tenth Circuit, that persons likely must be aware of police presence), and State v. Maxwell, 275 P.3d 220, 224 (Utah 2011) (applying a general reasonableness test). See also, e.g., State v. Gilstrap, 332 P.3d 43, [45] [46] with respect to the question of whether police can search the belongings of a visitor at a residence, the position adopted by Arizona and Oregon courts conflicts with that of Alaska, California, and Hawaii courts, all of which differ from the position adopted by the Ninth Circuit). 165 See FRIEDERICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944) ("Stripped of all [its] technicalities, [the rule of law] means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand-rules which make it possible to foresee . . . how . . . authority will use . . . coercive powers in given circumstances . . . ."); JERRY L. MASHAW, Of no less practical importance, intrastate variation creates the risk of forum shopping by government prosecutors. When a state and federal court adopt different positions it can be outcome-determinative whether (i) state/ local police or federal agents develop the case against a suspect 166 and (ii) in an instance of concurrent criminal jurisdiction, whether a matter is filed in state or federal court. 167 Faced with the prospect of having evidence suppressed in one court but not another, governments have a powerful incentive to seek out more advantageous doctrine, 168 aggravating law-avoidance already occurring when cases "go federal" in an effort to avoid application of a more generous state constitutional right. 169 To the extent that such strategic behavior undermines perception of government (writ large) cutting square corners, 170 the procedural justice literature suggests an attendant decrease in the public's sense of governmental legitimacy and its willingness to be law-abiding. 171
Civil Rights Litigation
The conflicts can also affect civil rights litigation. Under § 1983, officers enjoy personal qualified immunity from damage suits except when they violate "clearly established" constitutional law and are "plainly incompetent." 172 Although it was long the case that a state-federal conflict put law enforcement in the unenviable position of facing monetary liability for complying GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 138-39 (1997) (defining rule of law as "a system of objective and accessible commands, law which can be seen to flow from collective agreement rather than from the exercise of discretion or preference by those . . . who happen to be in positions of authority"). (2011) ("Local prosecutors are typically quite happy to have federal prosecutors take on local cases so that defendants receive longer sentences, and they often willingly use the prospect of federal prosecution to gain leverage in their own plea negotiations with defendants. Local police officers also often prefer the federal option for the same reasons." (footnote omitted)). 170 See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 116 (1980) 231, 240 (2008) . 172 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 , 2085 (2011 with a position adopted by their employer-government's court, 173 recent Supreme Court precedent has clarified that when a conflict exists and an officer acts in accord with her jurisdiction's doctrinal position, clearly established law cannot be said to have been violated. 174 The newly clarified position, however, comes at a cost: a right, recognized by either state or federal court, goes unenforced. 175 Conflict can also have a critical impact on less core yet still important matters in civil rights litigation. A prime example lays in varied judicial positions on whether a particular government actor qualifies as a "state" agent sufficient to bar suit under the Eleventh Amendment. 176 The California Supreme Court, for instance, has held that a county sheriff is a state agent for purposes of § 1983, barring suit; 177 the Ninth Circuit disagrees, and so will entertain a claim against a county sheriff. 178 Because federal civil rights claims can be filed in state or federal court, 179 the specter of forum shopping again looms, this time among plaintiffs (not prosecutors). 173 See, e.g., Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 772 (9th Cir. 2009 Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 7 (2013) (noting that it was "especially troubling that the Ninth Circuit would conclude that [the defendant state officer] was plainly incompetent-and subject to personal liability for damages-based on actions that were lawful according to courts in the jurisdiction where he acted"); cf. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2086 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("When faced with inconsistent legal rules in different jurisdictions, national officeholders should be given some deference for qualified immunity purposes, at least if they implement policies consistent with the governing law of the jurisdiction where the action is taken."). 
"Good Faith" and the Exclusionary Rule
Finally, variability can affect trial court decisions on the exclusion of evidence, in particular, application of the exclusionary rule's "good faith" exception, which protects police acting with an objectively "reasonable goodfaith belief" that their conduct is lawful. 180 Recently, in Davis v. United States, 181 the Supreme Court held that the exception applies when police comply with settled doctrine, even when the doctrine is later overturned by the Court. 182 In Davis, Alabama police relied on Eleventh Circuit caselaw based on accepted Supreme Court doctrine affording them a per se right to search the interior of a car incident to the lawful arrest of the driver, 183 a position disavowed by the Court after the search of Davis's car. 184 According to the majority, the officer at the time of the search reasonably relied upon and acted in a manner consistent with Supreme Court (and Eleventh Circuit) doctrine, removing any deterrence function served by the exclusionary rule. 185 The reliance question, however, is less clear when settled U.S. Supreme Court doctrine is not involved. What should the outcome be when the Court has not definitively spoken on the propriety of particular police conduct, and a state court has approved the conduct while its federal circuit has not (or vice versa), and the Court later condemns the conduct? Presumably, akin to the § 1983 context just discussed, agents acting in a manner consistent with a position adopted by their government's courts would be able to invoke the good faith exception. But if this is so then again the forum-filing decision of prosecutors can drive outcomes. In light of the discord, a preferred outcome, suggested during the Davis oral argument by Justice Sotomayor vis-à-vis federal circuit splits, 186 might be for the doctrinal uncertainty to bar application of the good faith exception. However, at present no such policy prevails, leaving outcomes to again vary with prosecutorial will. WL 972573, at *33 ("JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, if there's a circuit split, how do we encourage police officers to be careful about the Fourth Amendment? . . . . If there's a circuit split and a police officer knows that other circuits are saying this is unconstitutional, why are we taking away the deterrent effect of having thoughts occur to the officer about thinking through whether there's a better way and a legal way to do things?").
III. OBLIGING THE SUPREME COURT TO BE MORE "SUPREME"
As the preceding discussion makes clear, state-federal conflicts, while an inevitable and indeed beneficial byproduct of the nation's federalist system, create an array of significant problems. The challenge lies in arriving at a solution that accommodates these realities. This Part lays the foundation for the solution proposed in Part IV, by examining reforms proposed to date directed at mediating federal constitutional conflict.
A. Prior Proposals
Although over the years most concern over constitutional conflict has centered on differences between and among the federal circuits, 187 state-federal disuniformity has drawn a degree of limited attention. 188 One proposal, offered by Professor Daniel Meador in the early 1980s, urged creation of a new federal tribunal to review state court decisions concerning federal constitutional questions, 189 similar to the "national court of appeals" long suggested to resolve federal circuit conflicts. 190 Professor Meador saw the main advantage of the proposal as being that it would provide a "measure of nationwide uniformity . . . . The same tribunal would pass on all federal constitutional questions arising in state criminal proceedings. Thus the law could be kept on an even keel, and its development could be monitored more effectively." 191 Allowing direct appeal of state cases to a national intermediate federal tribunal, however, would be problematic for several reasons. Most significant, subjecting state courts to direct oversight by an über lower federal court would signal a troubling institutional distrust of state courts. 192 More practi-cally, the proposal itself, now over thirty years old, has suffered the same lack of success experienced by the national court of appeals vis-à-vis federal circuit splits, quelled by the Supreme Court's estimable ability to neutralize any perceived incursion on its appellate prerogative. 193 Equally unlikely to succeed for similar institutional reasons, and problematic for similarly succumbing to federal judicial-centrism, is the recent proposal that the Court's merits case logjam be remedied by creation of a new certiorari division, consisting of federal circuit judges, who would select cases for the Court to address. 194 It has also been suggested that state courts simply defer to lower federal court wisdom, 195 including that they follow federal positions in "lockstep" fashion, much as they often do in interpreting their own constitutions. 196 Such proposals, while ensuring uniformity, are deeply problematic because they again undercut state autonomy and ignore the instrumental benefits surveyed above. 197 They also risk lock-in of unfounded or unwise positions adopted by a majority (or consensus) of lower federal courts, 198 which could reflect nothing more than a bandwagon effect being at work, 199 and would have the practical effect of precluding state courts from adopting minority positions that ultimately get adopted by the Court, such as occurred in Florida v. Jardines, Georgia v. Randolph, and Arizona v. Gant. 200 Less problematic, Professor Donald Zeigler has argued that state courts should retain some interpretive independence but that they should seek to "decide federal questions the way they believe the Supreme Court would decide them." 201 State courts, he maintains, should strive to predict how the U.S. Supreme Court would resolve a federal constitutional or statutory question, serving in effect as the Court's agent. 202 With the "unifying perspective" afforded, 203 states will be "more likely to reach consistent results if they ask how the Supreme Court would evaluate conflicting lower court decisions." 204 Requiring state courts to decide in line with how they think the Supreme Court would rule is easier said than done, as Professor Zeigler himself acknowledged. 205 By the Court's own admission, stare decisis is not an "inexorable command" in constitutional matters, 206 and it is not unusual for the Court to reverse itself when a rule proves "unworkable" 207 or caselaw has "undermined [a precedent's] doctrinal underpinnings." 208 Predicting outcomes in constitutional criminal procedure, a doctrinal area more unstable than most, 209 is especially problematic. 210 Finally, it has been suggested that state courts be accorded freedom to construe federal constitutional provisions more generously than the Supreme Court, free of its review. Justice John Paul Stevens has been the most visible proponent of this view. 211 In keeping with the Court's early limited jurisdiction over state court treatment of federal claims, which allowed review only of cases denying claim of a federal right, 212 Justice Stevens has urged that the Court withhold review when a state court has honored a federal rights claim and the state-government appellant in effect asserts that the court "'overprotected' the citizen." 213 According to Justice Stevens, allowing state courts such latitude would permit federal rights to be tailored "in the light of local conditions," 214 without individual state preferences impacting other states. 215 Justice Stevens's position has been advocated by and elaborated upon by others, 216 and while it has considerable appeal, 217 it elides the serious difficulties associated with intrastate disuniformity. Even if Justice Stevens is correct that the impact of granting a more expansive right is not externalized to other jurisdictions, 218 the problem remains that negative effects will be inter-nalized in individual states, as the variable doctrinal positions play out on the streets and in state and federal courthouses.
B. The Imperative of Supreme Court Intervention
By design, the conflicts surveyed here can only be resolved by the nation's "one supreme Court." 219 It alone is "supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution," 220 and is empowered to resolve constitutional uncertainty 221 and ensure uniformity. 222 State and lower federal courts alike recognize the Court's singular role in this regard and expect the Court to fulfill its duty. 223 In theory, the Court does so by exercise of its discretionary certiorari authority. Since first being afforded by Congress in the late nineteenth century, and augmented since, the Court's certiorari power has been marked by a quid pro quo: that, in return for being relieved of its historically heavy JURISDICTION § 10.1, at 638-39 (4th ed. 2003 ) (stating that the Court's power to review state and lower federal court opinions "serves to ensure the uniformity of federal law," allowing "federal law [to] mean the same thing in all parts of the country"); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 , 1379 , 1385 (1997 (emphasizing Court's role "as the authoritative settler of constitutional meaning" and warning of "interpretive anarchy" in its absence); see also FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT (1972 COURT ( ), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, 578 (1973 (describing the core roles of the Court as being "to define and vindicate . . . rights guaranteed by the Constitution, to assure the uniformity of federal law, and to maintain the constitutional distribution of powers in a federal union"). 223 As the Florida Court of Appeals put it:
In a system where the decisions of lower federal courts in Florida are not binding on the state courts, there may very well be occasions when the federal courts hold one way, while the state courts hold the contrary. That is after all a consequence of our system of dual sovereignty. The remedy is simple: the United States Supreme Court can eliminate the conflict by simply taking up an appropriate case for review. Kidwell v. State, 696 So. 2d 399, 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). It is hard to say why this is so, given the Court's famously inscrutable certiorari decision-making process. 233 Perhaps the Justices are comforted by the expectation that conflicts, if worthy of certiorari, will come before them again; 234 or that they will in time resolve themselves on their own through the common law process. 235 Even if correct, however, such self-assurance gives short shrift to the real-world negative consequences of the discord, noted earlier, accruing in the interim. 236 From an institutional perspective, the Court's failure is troubling enough; yet it becomes more so in light of the fact that constitutional settlement cannot be achieved by other means. Without Supreme Court review, as then-Professor Ruth Ginsburg noted, a state court can effectively immunize its decision because " [t] he state court's federal law determination [cannot] be overturned" by the state electorate or legislature. 237 At the same time, federal constitutional amendment-through Article V 238 -holds no more promise. Although it is conceivable that a decision or series of decisions from the Court could generate discord sufficient to trigger the amendment process, it is highly unlikely that an unpopular state court decision would do so, if for no other reason than that its effects would be cabined to a single state. 239 As a consequence, in the absence of Supreme Court intervention, state and lower federal courts enjoy plenary power over federal constitutional law in their respective spheres, 240 without any felt obligation to coordinate or 233 See Watts, supra note 225, at 14-21 (discussing transparency concerns). 234 In one of the standard treatments of the Court's agenda-setting dynamic, for instance, William Perry relates how justices and their clerks see cases in terms of their "fungibility": that the issue raised in a petition will resurface in the petition pool. H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE 221 (1991) . According to one clerk: "[The issue is] going to come up again if it's really an important issue. . . . I can say I never really feared that if we don't take it now or miss this one, that we won't have the chance to decide it again. " Id. 235 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Workways of the Supreme Court, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 517, 521 (2003) (noting that the Court does not focus on splits "likely to heal"). 236 See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 560 (1982) ("[Y] ears may pass before the Court finally invalidates a police practice of dubious constitutionality."). 237 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Book Review, 92 HARV. L. REV. 340, 343-44 (1978) (reviewing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978) ). 238 U.S. CONST. art. V. 239 See Mazzone, supra note 49, at 1050-51; see also id. ("While multiple state courts ruling in a highly unpopular way on a constitutional issue might provoke an amendment, such instances are likely to be very rare."). State court conflict with circuit norms could conceivably be avoided by a state constitutional amendment. Florida, for instance, in the 1980s amended its state constitution to reflect that search and seizure doctrine will conform to the opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court. See Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d 724, 730 (Fla. 2013) 
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
In the absence of an effective and reliable certiorari regime, something is needed to oblige the Supreme Court to resolve the conflicts surveyed here, constituting what Justice Joseph Story referred to as the "jarring and discorfrom the state courts, state courts now exercise final authority in virtually every federal question case that comes before them."). 241 In this sense, they function in a manner akin to stand-alone industries in the national marketplace, which are inured to "network effects" that pressure businesses to standardize and conform to market norms. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 105 (1994) ("In markets with network effects, there is [a] natural tendency toward de facto standardization, which means everyone [is] using the same system."). On network effects more generally, see Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479 (1998) . 242 See, e.g., Conner v. State, 303 S.E.2d 266, 273 (Ga. 1983) ("[W] e are not bound by decisions of the lower federal courts. Nonetheless, it would be . . . myopic of us to ignore federal precedent, if only because of the inevitability of federal collateral review . . . ."); Commonwealth v. Negri, 213 A.2d 670, 672 (Pa. 1965 ) ("If the Pennsylvania courts refuse to abide by [the Third Circuit's] conclusions, then the individual to whom we deny relief need only to 'walk across the street' to gain a different result. Such an unfortunate situation would cause disrespect for the law."). 243 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976) (holding that state court Fourth Amendment decisions are to be reviewed only if a petitioner lacked a "full" and "fair" opportunity to litigate the issue in state court); see also J. Thomas Sullivan, Danforth, Retroactivity, and Federalism, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 425, 467 (2008) ("[Stone] effectively insulated the bulk of state court determinations from review in the federal system except by petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court itself."). 244 See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § § 2241 -2254 ). As a result of the AEDPA, a federal court is to assess only whether a state decision is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or was based on an "unreasonable determination of the facts." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(2). The Court has "emphasized, time and again, that [the AEDPA] prohibits the federal courts of appeal from relying on their own precedent to conclude that a particular constitutional principle is 'clearly established. '" Lopez v. Smith, No. 13-946, 2014 WL 4956764, at *1 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014 . 245 A state court decision, the Supreme Court has instructed, is to be invalidated only if it is "so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011) dant judgments" that only the Court can "harmonize . . . into uniformity." 246 The prospect for change, it should be noted at the outset, is not likely to be forthcoming from the Court itself, which reflexively resists any effort seen as limiting its docket-selection prerogative. 247 Yet an option remains that can compel the Court's intervention: certification. Since 1802, certification has allowed disputed questions of federal law, generated by lower federal courts, to get to the Supreme Court for resolution. 248 Absent certification, Chief Justice Marshall wrote in 1821, a "division of opinion" might "remain[ ] and the question would continue unsettled." 249 Certification was widely used in nineteenth-century criminal cases 250 and it later figured centrally in congressional creation of the several federal circuit courts of appeal to "guard against diversity of judgment in . . . different courts." 251 Technically a vestige of the Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction, 252 the availability of certification allayed congressional concern that the Court would falter in its settlement role after it was afforded essentially plenary certiorari discretion in 1925. 253 225, at 1656 ("[C] ertiorari was envisioned as a sort of fallback provision should the circuit courts of appeals prove, on occasion, to be surprisingly careless in deciding cases or issuing certificates.").
the fact that certification remains a part of the U.S. Code, 254 it has been used only infrequently since 1940 (and not at all since 1981). 255 Joining a handful of other scholars suggesting resuscitation of certification more generally, 256 I recently urged elsewhere that the certification statute be retooled by Congress to require that the Court accept a certified question of constitutional law on which two or more federal circuit courts have split. 257 Certification is equally suited to resolve intra-circuit, state-federal conflicts yet Congress has never even nominally made the instrument available to state courts. 258 Although the reason for the absence of a state certification mechanism cannot be identified with certainty, 259 the omission is in keeping with the common yet mistaken sensibility that federal courts are the sole source of federal constitutional common law (and hence potential conflict). The time is long past due for Congress to expand certification and give effect to the significant federal constitutional role that state courts have come to play. 260 In so doing, Congress, which itself has a strong institutional interest in promoting and ensuring the Court's settlement role, 261 would act in a manner in keeping with the originating purpose of certification: to resolve intra-juris- Pub. L. 97-164, § 123, 96 Stat. 36 (1982) ). 260 An evolution manifested, for instance, in the decision by Congress in 1914 to grant the Court discretionary certiorari power beyond state cases denying a federal right to include cases granting a federal right. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 261 See Grove, supra note 224, at 944-46 (surveying interest from the late nineteenth century onward among members of Congress, from across the political spectrum, in the institutional role of the Court as the arbiter of constitutional conflict). dictional conflicts (stemming from deadlocked two-judge circuit panels in existence early in the nation's history). 262 Mindful of the political and institutional ramifications of adding to the Court's mandatory jurisdiction, however, the expansion in certification should extend to only intrastate, state-federal circuit court conflicts. 263 Although conflicts between other courts-state courts with one another and a state court with a federal circuit in another region-are problematic in principle, they do not present the many serious practical difficulties of intrastate, state-federal conflicts noted above. 264 The mechanics of the amended certification provision could largely track those of the current regime. As now required, consistent with congressional authority to "regulat[e]" the Court's appellate jurisdiction 265 requirements, 268 either on its own initiative or as a result of argument of the parties. 269 Current law on when a question can be certified, however, would benefit from modification. The certification statute at present provides that a court can seek to have a question certified "at any time." 270 Adding a requirement that a state or federal circuit court actually resolve a question in a conflicting matter would reserve the Court's resources for conflicts that actually come to fruition and create the concrete harms surveyed above. Requiring an actual decision, moreover, would provide the Court with the benefit of the reasoning of lower courts, should it wish to avail itself of that reasoning.
Such a change would have several significant benefits. First and foremost, it would allow for the accelerated, authoritative resolution of conflicts, 271 which, while a natural and even beneficial part of the nation's constitutional structure, create an array of difficulties. 272 It would also promote judicial efficiency, 273 as it is not unusual for the same doctrinal dispute to arise and exist not only in several states within a given circuit, 274 but also in other circuits. 275 Second, the expansion would afford state and lower federal courts alike a means to participate in the Court's docket-assemblage process, again con-sistent with a main originating purpose of certification. 276 Courts, not litigants, would "distinguish a small handful of cases from the flood of frequently worthless certiorari petitions that engulf the Court," 277 which themselves regularly fail to highlight intrastate conflict. 278 Doing so would also loosen the grip of the powerful Supreme Court Bar, which has come under criticism for its undue influence over the Court's merits docket. 279 Equally if not more important, the expansion would facilitate greater engagement by the Court in the refinement of its criminal procedure doctrine, 280 especially as it involves state courts, 281 whose decisions today account for only a negligible part of the Court's docket 282 -a diminished number that has disproportionately contributed to the massive decrease in the Court's overall docket size in recent years. 283 Despite the foregoing benefits, the changes proposed will likely generate opposition. Those revering Bickelian "passive virtues" and judicial restraint more generally, 284 for instance, will not rush to embrace a more ambitious constitutional settlement role from the Court. Indeed, to some the Court's lack of involvement is actually a good thing, allowing constitutional matters to "percolate" until such time as the Court sees fit to intervene. 285 Percolation, however, remains highly contestable, despite occasional mention by the Court of its virtues. 286 As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted over twenty-five years ago:
[T]o . . . suggest that it is actually desirable to allow important questions of federal law to "percolate" in the lower courts for a few years before the Supreme Court takes them on seems to me a very strange suggestion . . . .
. . . We are not engaged in a scientific experiment or in an effort to square the circle . . . . [T] here is no obviously "correct" . . . answer in the philosophical or mathematical sense, but the "definitive" answer, and the definitive answer can be given . . . only by the court of last resort. It is of little solace to the litigant who lost years ago in a court of appeals decision to learn that his case was part of the "percolation" process which ultimately allowed the Supreme Court to vindicate his position. 287 Nor is percolation evidenced much in the actual workings of the Supreme Court, based on the survey undertaken here of Roberts Court criminal procedure decisions. Only in a single instance did the Court forthrightly articulate and contextualize doctrinal variation among state and lower federal courts on a question. 288 Although the absence of overt critical examination of the merits of doctrinal positions of course does not conclusively disprove operation of percolation, 289 the failure to articulate intellectual underpinnings of competing decisions, at a minimum, undermines the posited informed deliberateness of percolation and justifies skepticism over its place in constitutional decisionmaking. 290 In any event, whatever advantages that might accrue from percolation are substantially outweighed by the very substantial costs of disuniformity. 291 As noted by Justice Brandeis, "it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right." 292 A more valid potential concern lies in whether a state or federal court, upon adopting a variant position, might lack incentive to certify. In Arizona v. Gant, for instance, the Arizona Supreme Court, preferring the discordant position it adopted limiting police authority to search a car incident to arrest, could well have been content to not run the risk of having itself reversed and lose at least the state-bounded effect of its decision. Given this possibility, Congress should empower federal circuit courts with certification power in the event of a conflict with state courts within their territory. To further limit the risk of avoidance, consideration should be given to allowing the Office of the Solicitor General, an institutional actor charged with being a superintendent of national law, 293 to seek clarification by means of certification. 294 Ultimately, the risk of avoidance would hopefully be mitigated by awareness of the practical problems, highlighted here, resulting from conflict. It also can be hoped that a second-in-time deciding court will have an incentive 290 See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 18, at 57 ("I doubt that the strength of an inferior court's conviction that a particular interpretation provides the best reading will-or should-influence the Supreme Court's independent judgment."); Henry J. Friendly, The "Law of the Circuit" and All That, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 405, 407 (1972) ("I doubt whether many of the Justices even read our opinions, at least on constitutional issues, except as these are filtered through the briefs of counsel or the memoranda of law clerks."). 291 See supra Section II.B. The case for waiting is especially weak when a state court and federal circuit court have decided a constitutional question, applicable to the single state alone, and are at loggerheads. In such an instance, no other avenue for redress-such as a conflict arising between another state court and its federal circuit-will be at play, and the conflict and the problems it generates will simply fester. 292 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Franklin Ford (Feb. 8, 1908) , in THE ESSEN-TIAL HOLMES 201 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992) (" [O] ne of the first things for a court to remember is that people care more to know that the rules of the game will be stuck to, than to have the best possible rules."); see also Sanford Levinson, Assessing the Supreme Court's Current Caseload: A Question of Law or Politics?, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 99, 100 (2010) (stating that it need not be the case that "the Court's own decision will exhibit any particularly great wisdom or serve the country well. Rather, it is an almost Hobbesian argument that there must be a sovereign to resolve controversies, and that such a role should be played . . . by the Supreme Court."). to certify and have its constitutional position possibly vindicated by the nation's highest court and imposed nationwide.
Finally, it might be asserted that the proposal advanced here will flood the Court with an unmanageable influx of cases. Such a concern has little warrant, however, given the limited expansion outlined here. The conflicts identified in Part II, despite the considerable difficulties they create, number roughly only twenty; a volume that could be easily absorbed in a single Term 295 given the Court's modest-sized docket. 296 Nonetheless, to the extent the Court feels that its increased workload is too onerous, it could grant certiorari in fewer cases involving federal statutory interpretation conflicts, which as commentators have noted present less pressing need for uniformity. 297 
CONCLUSION
Although it has long been accepted that state and lower federal courts enjoy concurrent authority over the interpretation and application of the U.S. Constitution, 298 little attention has been paid to the ramifications of this power-sharing arrangement. 299 This Article has sought to remedy the deficit by shining a spotlight on a particularly important outgrowth of state-federal concurrent authority: the conflicting positions on federal constitutional criminal procedure doctrine adopted by federal circuit and state courts within individual states. 300 295 Inasmuch as the conflicts identified here are not intended to be exhaustive in number, and more exist or come into existence, they could be addressed over two or more Terms. REV. 535, 549 n.77 (2010) (condemning the undue emphasis on certiorari grants in cases involving federal statutory conflicts, made in the name of achieving uniformity, while acknowledging that "[o]f course, individual rights ought to be protected uniformly across the country"); Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1569 n.5 (2008) (noting the same and that " [v] aried interpretation of federal constitutional law raises different, and arguably more troubling, questions"). 298 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 299 See Devins & Mansker, supra note 77, at 457 (footnote omitted) ("Notwithstanding the profound and ever-growing influence of state supreme courts, their decision making receives scant attention from journalists and legal academics."). 300 The deficit is all the more glaring given the recent scholarly examination of state court interpretation of federal statutory law. See, e.g 1898, 1904 (2011). As this Article makes clear, creation of a "crazy quilt" of conflicting federal constitutional rights, which Justice Scalia has inveighed against, 301 generates an array of distinct and quite significant difficulties when localized. Yet the problems and the conflicts giving rise to them often go unaddressed by the Supreme Court, whose discretionary certiorari-based docket remains smaller than at any time in its modern history.
In response, this Article has proposed that Congress amend the federal certification statute to allow state and federal circuit courts to certify questions in instances of intrastate federal constitutional conflict. 302 Doing so not only will compel the Court to fulfill its role as the nation's ultimate arbiter of constitutional disputes and cure the serious problems that they create; it will also elevate state courts to their rightful place in federal constitutional discourse and afford a mechanism for greater engagement between state and lower federal courts and the nation's "one supreme Court," charged with overseeing their work and ensuring federal constitutional consistency.
301 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 185 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 40 (1970) (suggesting that the "checkerboard of [criminal procedure] rights" during the pre-incorporation period "had to be short-lived"). 302 While the discussion here focuses on constitutional criminal procedure, which as discussed presents particularly important questions of government power affecting liberty and privacy, the certification mechanism proposed could extend to other contested federal constitutional questions, which create similar difficulties. However, any expansion would of course have corresponding direct impact on the Court's docket, which must be weighed.
